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The Antidumping Law:
Repeal It or Revise It
JOHN J. BARCEL6 III
Congress should reconsider the Antidumping Act of
1921 (hereinafter the Act)." The Act as currently applied affords
American business tarifflike relief from import competition when
only minimal standards of injury are met. This relief is in the name
of combating an unfair trade practice, dumping-selling at a lower
price for export than for home consumption. The Act's treatment of
dumping as a criterion of illegality, however, is quixotic; it is also
adverse to American welfare. It is quixotic because price discrimina-
tion is a normal phenomenon in healthy international trade. It dimin-
ishes national welfare because it restricts imports excessively and,
more importantly, chills price competition (as is the case with any
anti-price discrimination law) from imports. It thus fuels inflation
both by decreasing the supply of goods and by discouraging foreign
suppliers from competing on price in the American market.
Other laws, most particularly the antimonopolization provisions in
section 2 of the Sherman Act,2 protect us better from the one possible
danger of dumping-predatory pricing designed to monopolize an
American market. That threat is not very real. All other arguments
against dumping are either fallacious or reduce to arguments against
injury from any import competition. Arguments of the latter sort
have nothing to do with price discrimination. The proper remedy for
mischief not unique to dumping is to be found in the "safeguard"
provisions of our trade legislation: escape clause relief (trade restric-
tions) or adjustment assistance (domestic subsidization). Hence, the
United States could very well do without an antidumping law.
The discussion which follows concentrates only on American anti-
dumping, safeguard, and antitrust laws. The analysis, however,
should have general application to any country in the western trading
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world. All such countries have antidumping and safeguard provi-
sions patterned along the general guidelines in Articles VI and XIX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT).3 Any country
which does not provide protection against predatory pricing through
a general antitrust law might resort to a revised antidumping law
aimed only at predatory dumping.
Although this article advocates that the United States should rely
upon its safeguard law--escape clause and adjustment assistance
provisions-in all cases now processed under the Antidumping Act,
it does not assert that this law is ideal, as drafted or as applied. It
would take us too far afield, however, to set forth a model of ideal
safeguard provisions. The article assumes, however, that it is sound
to provide some form of temporary protection against sudden eco-
nomic dislocations caused by imports.
4
SAFEGUARD AND ANTIDUMPING RELIEF COMPARED
The current safeguard provisions (applying to all imports from what-
ever source) embody a basic policy trade-off in American law be-
tween positive consumer and negative producer (and worker) effects
of low-priced imports. The rationale is that protection against high
dislocation costs caused by imports is perfectly sound for a temporary
period, but in the long run overall national welfare is best served
through gradual adjustment to import competition rather than per-
manent import restrictions.
Antidumping legislation, however, is said to provide an additional
basis for restricting imports in special cases, but with a softer injury
test. A bald pronouncement that dumping is unfair can hardly be
adequate justification for this special treatment. In my view, the
significantly lower injury threshold in an antidumping case is not
justified and merely means that the Act functions as a mushier sur-
rogate for escape clause relief.
Statutory Standards
Under the safeguard provisions a claimant may obtain either an es-
cape clause remedy-increased import restrictions--or adjustment as-
sistance-various forms of financial and technical assistance ("sub-
sidies"). Before any relief may be granted, the ITC must find that "an
article is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat
thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article. ' 5 If the ITC so finds, it must
recommend an appropriate form of relief-either escape clause or
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adjustment assistance-to the President, who in his discretion must
decide what relief to grant, if any. If the President acts contrary to the
ITC's recommendation, Congress, by concurrent resolution, may
override the President and implement the ITC's recommendation.
An antidumping proceeding, on the other hand, involves no such
discretion, and includes nothing comparable to adjustment assis-
tance as an optional remedy. If the Secretary of the Treasury first
determines that imports are being sold at "less than fair value"
(hereinafter LTFV) 6-at a price for export to the United States below
the home market price or a surrogate therefor-the ITC must then
determine "whether an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured,... by reason of the importation of such [LTFV]
merchandise .... ,,7 A finding of injury requires Treasury to impose
an antidumping duty equal to the margin of dumping.
From the face of these two statutes, a softer injury test appears to
apply in antidumping cases. Nothing in the antidumping statute re-
quires a finding of "imports in increased quantities" as under the
safeguard provisions.8 More significantly, on the important questions
of substantiality of injury and degree of causal nexus between im-
ports and injury, the safeguard provisions are far more definite and
demanding. They provide that there must be "serious injury" and
that the imports in question must be a "substantial cause" of that
injury. Substantial cause is defined as "a cause which is important
and not less than any other cause."9 The antidumping statute merely
requires "injury" and "by reason of" causation. Even if the term
"injury" is read to mean "material injury" as provided in Article VI
of the GATr, 10 "material" appears to be a lower standard than "seri-
ous."'1  The causation standard "by reason of" is of course altogether
without restrictive content.
The Injury Test in Practice
Decisions under the two statutes are consistent with my analysis of
their language. The ITC more readily finds injury in dumping than
in safeguard proceedings. This can be said despite some inconsis-
tency and sparseness of reasoning in its decision*. The difference in
approach occurs in the ITC's treatment under the two statutes of
such factors as market segmentation, criteria of injury, substantial-
ity of injury, and causal nexus between imports and injury.
Under both statutes the ITC has felt free to narrow the market
definition within which injury is measured to one geographic region
in the country,' 2 but the narrowing process has gone further in
dumping cases, even to the point of characterizing the market in a
single urban area as an industry. 3 Criteria of injury are also more
lax in a dumping case. In a safeguard proceeding, the ITC looks to
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several measures of injury, including decreased sales, lower produc-
tion, inability to earn reasonable profits, unemployment, and under-
utilization of plant capacity, with no single factor being decisive.1 4 In
an antidumping proceeding, although all the above criteria are some-
times mentioned, 15 only two criteria-market invasion and depres-
sion of prices-appear decisive. 16 Indeed, in some dumping cases the
ITC (or its predecessor, the Tariff Commission) has found injury on
the basis of a declining price structure alone. 17
The same pattern emerges on the degree of injury required, both as
to the standards articulated and the results reached. In a recent safe-
guard case arising under the "serious injury" language of the 1974
Trade Act, the ITC said this test requires "an important, crippling, or
mortal injury; one having permanent or lasting consequences."18 In
sharp contrast, the ITC applies a de minimis test of injury in anti-
dumping cases, articulated in the 1967 Cast Iron Soil Pipe from
Poland19 decision as follows:
Any injury which is more than de minimis is material injury.
When the Congress used the word "injury" in the Act without
qualification of degree the only exception that one might reason-
ably apply to the word is the old legal maxim that "the law does
not concern itself with trifles.1
2 0
Comparing the degree of injury in a few illustrative cases yields
the expected conclusion-less injury is needed for antidumping than
for safeguard relief. Two recent split decisions under the safeguard
provision probably indicate the maximum quantum of business in-
jury which will fail to result in a finding of legal injury. In Aspara-
gus 2 ' half the Commissioners found lack of serious injury when mar-
ket invasion was 9.1 percent and worker layoffs in the industry were
significant. More strikingly, in Cast Iron Stoves, 22 imports had
grown from 10.5 percent of the market in 1972 to 64.7 percent in
1976, employment levels were down by 44 percent, profits had fallen
by 7.7 percent, and capacity utilization had decreased by nearly 50
percent; however, no injury was found.
There are no negative antidumping decisions with such high quan-
titative indicia of injury. Indeed, the 1921 Act itself provides that a
split decision is to be treated as a finding of injuryi 3 More impor-
tantly, the indicators of injury in affirmative antidumping decisions
are frequently well below the figures in Asparagus and Cast Iron
Stoves. In the late 1960s and early 1970s-perhaps the high point of
lax antidumping decisions-injury findings were made in cases of
less than 2 percent market invasion24 apparently on the basis of de-
clining price structure alone2 5 and in some cases in which domestic
profit, capacity utilization, or other indicators were even moving
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upward.2 6 Recent findings of injury in dumping cases follow a simi-
lar pattern.
27
There is also disparity in ITC decisions under the two statutes with
respect to causation.
In one of its first decisions under the "substantial cause" language
introduced in the safeguard provisions of the 1974 Act, the ITC ex-
plained that proof of "substantial cause" would require meeting a
two-part test. First, imports must be an "important" cause, which
means that they must be "'significantly' more than a 'de minimis'
cause .... ,,28 so that "where increased imports are just one cause of
many causes of equal weight, it would be unlikely that they would
constitute an 'important' cause. '29 Second, imports must be a cause
which is "'not less than any other' cause," 30 which means that "no
cause is more important than imports." 31 In a number of recent safe-
guard decisions, the ITC has failed to find injury because-although
there was some causal link between imports and economic injury-
recessionary conditions, 32 increased competition from new pro-
cesses, 33 or substitute products were more important causes.'
4
By contrast, the causation test in antidumping cases is extremely
attenuated. In the years immediately prior to enactment of the 1974
Act, the ITC (then the Tariff Commission) developed a gossamer-
thin test of causation requiring only that dumped imports contribute
to injury, perhaps by a factor only slightly greater than de minimis
in significance. In Ferrite Cores from Japan, for example, the Com-
missioners in the majority asserted that "if injury is attributable in
part to the LTFV sales of the ferrite cores and such injury is more
than de minimis, we must make an affirmative determination. The
relative importance of such injury to injuries caused by other fac-
tors is irrelevant." 35 Again, in Pig Iron from Canada, Finland &
West Germany, the majority said: "[I]t is not necessary to show that
imports were the sole cause nor even the major cause of injury as
long as the facts show that LTFV imports were more than a de
minimis factor in contributing to the injury.' 36 Recent decisions of
the ITC have continued to apply this anything-more-than-de mini-
mis test of causation.
37
Degree of Trade Restrictiveness
Even if the standards for antidumping relief are considerably lower
than those for a safeguard remedy, it could be argued that the nature
of antidumping relief and it status as an unfair trade remedy diminish
its interference with free trade objectives. Those who so argue might
stress, first, that antidumping duties are limited to the margin of
dumping, whereas escape clause relief could include, in addition to
tariffs, more objectionable forms of relief, such as quotas or voluntary
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restraint agreements (and in whatever measure required to prevent
injury).38 Second, antidumping relief is granted only against imports
from selective countries in which exporters have been found to be
dumping, thus minimizing the tendency of higher tariffs to increase
prices to consumers, whereas escape clause relief is applied against
all imports on a Most Favored Nation basis. Third, since antidumping
duties protect against "unfair" competition, they decrease pressure on
trading partners to retaliate with increased tariffs of their own. More-
over, the availability of such relief tends to deflect strong protectionist
pressures from the business and labor communities away from the
much larger amount of "fair" trade.
Turning first to the third argument, one may wonder why protec-
tionist forces would not exploit to the maximum all means of restrict-
ing import competition, whether fair or unfair. By the same token, it
is not likely that trading partners will be so easily duped into accept-
ing our characterizations of their trade as unfair.39 In my view, it
would be sounder to confront the problem of serious injury from im-
port competition openly and directly by negotiating an agreement
with our trading partners for the proper use of safeguard measures
and then holding our own domestic interests to those guidelines.
The first two arguments are also unpersuasive. Escape clause re-
lief, although applicable on a Most Favored Nation basis, is subject
to presidential discretion, in part because resort to such action re-
quires that an offsetting concession be granted to countries injured
thereby. 40 This both inhibits resort to such a remedy and tends to
prevent the average level of trade restriction from increasing.41 More-
over, in contrast to the antidumping law, the safeguard provisions of
the 1974 Act authorize adjustment assistance in place of, or as a
supplement to, escape clause relief, an authority the President fre-
quently utilizes. 42 From a welfare economics perspective, adjust-
ment assistance is preferable to trade restrictions. It goes only to the
individual firms and workers actually injured and does not impose
costs on the consumer through higher prices.
43
Furthermore, safeguard relief is temporary, and the escape clause
version of it is usually reduced gradually over its life cycle, whereas
antidumping duties are a permanent bar to price discrimination from
a given country. Although antidumping relief is limited to the mar-
gin of dumping, in any given case that could be greater than neces-
sary to prevent injury. If protection against injury is the mischief to
be corrected, the margin of dumping standard is an irrational ap-
proach to the problem. It is worse than irrational. It strikes at the
heart of competitive rivalry-price competition. Thus the message to
the foreign competitor is to compete in the American market as well
as he can through better service, improved product quality or in-
creased advertising, but to be cautious about lowering his price,
The Antidumping Law • 59
because if he does so he may be found to be dumping and thus be
subject to the softer injury test of the antidumping law.
In summary, then, antidumping relief conflicts with the objectives
of free trade policy more than safeguard relief, especially adjustment
assistance. This is in part because once dumping is found, antidump-
ing relief is available under a distinctly softer test of injury. Is there
something special about dumping, not yet treated, which justifies
the costs consumers must pay to combat it?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DUMPING
The concept of dumping or price discrimination unquestionably car-
ries with it a pejorative connotation in the minds of many business-
men and noneconomists. There seems to be something unfair about
charging one price to buyer A and a different price to buyer B, if the
costs of supplying the two are equal. Normally, however, the unfair-
ness would seem to lie in charging some customers the higher price,
not the lower one. Those opposed to dumping in international trade, of
course, are exercised over the low price. In the antidumper's mind,
concern over the low price is probably linked to several notions which
call for careful analysis: (1) the dumper may be a predator seeking to
drive out competition and monopolize the target market; (2) dumping
is a practice of foreign monopolists who may operate behind high
protective tariffs at home, thus giving them an unfair advantage; (3) a
low dumping price may be unfair, because it is not cost-justified-it
does not bear a ratable share of the suppliers total costs and is in effect
subsidized by the high home market prices, which bear more than a
ratable share of full costs; (4) a low dumping price may be temporary,
and thus may impose wasteful adjustment costs upon domestic pro-
ducers without long-term benefits to consumers.
The most important misconception about dumping is that price, to
be "fair" or "just," must be set at a single level based solely on cost of
production-that a price, to be "fair," must bear a ratable share of
the full costs of production. This completely omits from the pricing
process the demand side of the law of supply and demand. A rational,
nonpredatory supplier may dump merely because he is responding to
different demand conditions in a genuine effort to maximize profits.
The Requirements for Dumping
Dumping technically can occur whenever two conditions are met: (1)
it is possible to separate national markets; and (2) the dumper has
some degree of market power at home. The first condition may exist
because of tariff barriers in the home market, high transport costs, or
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unique design for exported products, any of which would make it
infeasible to undercut the higher home market price by re-imports of
the lower priced exported goods. The second condition requires that
the dumper be able to affect the price in his home market by increas-
ing or decreasing supply. A producer is commonly able to do this, for
very few markets are supplied by a large number of relatively small
producers, each able to sell essentially all of its output, or any fore-
seeable expansion of its output, at the prevailing market price-the
conditions of perfect competition.
For dumping to be profitable, however, a third condition must be
satisfied: the price elasticity of demand must be greater in the export
market than at home. A highly elastic demand signifies that a small
decrease in price will generate a relatively large increase in con-
sumption. A highly inelastic demand signifies that consumers are
strongly wedded to the product and are not affected very much by
changes in price. It is not at all uncommon that demand for a prod-
uct in an export market will be more elastic than home demand. The
foreign product in an export market may have to compete with many
alternate sources of supply, both from local production and other
exporters not confronted at home; and buyer attachment to foreign
products may be lessened by the greater risks, longer lead times,
reduced services, and suspicions of inferior quality which sometimes
accompany imports. Individual sellers often assume that foreign de-
mand is more elastic than home demand. They expect domestic com-
petitors to follow suit if they cut prices at home, but anticipate less
reaction from sellers based in foreign markets.
44
Given these prerequisites, one would not expect dumping to be
rare. National markets are often separated by long distances, tariff
or other import restrictions, and differing product specifications. Im-
perfect competition is common, and price elasticity of demand would
often seem to be greater abroad than at home.
Profit Maximization-Equalizing Marginal
Revenue in All Markets
The expected frequency of dumping is of course also related to its
profitability. Given the three conditions just discussed, selling for
export more cheaply than for home consumption will actually max-
imize a firm's profits.
If a firm may distribute its output in two separate markets with
different demand characteristics, it will maximize its profit by divid-
ing its sales between the two markets in order that the same mar-
ginal revenue is earned from the sale of the last increment of output
in each market, and the common marginal revenue thus obtained
equals the marginal cost of producing that total output. If marginal
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revenue is unequal in the two markets, greater revenue could be
earned by shifting output from the lower-yielding (lower marginal
revenue) to the higher-yielding (higher marginal revenue) market.
This process should continue until marginal revenue in the former
market rises to meet falling marginal revenue in the latter. Total
output should be adjusted until a similar equality exists between
marginal cost and the common marginal revenue. If marginal cost is
below marginal revenue, total output must be expanded, since extra
profit (revenue exceeds cost) can be earned on additional sales in
both markets; the reverse of course holds if marginal cost exceeds
marginal revenue.
It is less intuitive, but nevertheless true, that if marginal revenue
is equal in two separate markets, price will be lower in the market
with more elastic demand. Marginal revenue is always less than
price at any given output, because to sell more of a product, price
must normally be lowered. The marginal revenue from an extra unit
of sales is never quite equal to the new selling price, because some
revenue is lost on all prior output now sold at a new lower price. The
more elastic the demand, however, the smaller will be the gap be-
tween marginal revenue and price. When demand is elastic, a slight
fall in price causes a large increase in total sales. Thus with elastic
demand, less revenue is lost on prior output (because price falls less)
to generate a given amount of new sales. Since marginal revenue is
equal in both markets when profits are maximized and always below
the price in either market, price must be lower (closer to the common
marginal revenue) in the more elastic market.
The Innocence of Dumping Below Average Cost
It is a common misconception that a low dumping price is necessar-
ily unfair if it is below average total cost (unit cost). This view seems
to underlie the 1974 Act provision rejecting home market or third
country sales as a reference price for dumping determinations if
these prices are "less than the cost of producing the merchandise. ' '45
The same notion is reflected in Treasury's new trigger price mecha-
nism for certain steel products. 46 Under those provisions the price
which triggers a Treasury dumping investigation is based on the
manufacturing costs of Japanese firms, assumed to be the world's
most efficient producers.
47
Economists and businessmen would agree that a firm (at least a
domestic firm), having sunk its investment but facing inadequate
demand, should continue to operate in the short run as long as price
exceeds average variable rather than average total cost. It would
thus make at least some contribution to its fixed costs which, in the
short run, would be incurred with or without production. Perhaps
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some would argue that this justification for below-cost pricing should
be denied a foreign dumper, because the impermanence of the low
price would fail to outweigh producer injury. But the argument in
the dumping context often has a long-run frame of reference: that a
dumper should not be allowed, as a long-run practice, to price below
unit cost, because if he does so he is not covering his full costs on the
low-priced sales; the earnings from the high-priced sales are being
used to subsidize the dumping operations.
48
Arguments of this kind are fallacious. If the dumper is maximizing
his profits by selling his total output in two markets so that marginal
cost equals marginal revenue in both markets, he is making the
maximum possible contribution to fixed as well as variable costs. A
higher price in the export market or a lower one in the home market
would reduce his profits and hence reduce his contribution to fixed
and variable costs.
Whether a given profit-maximizing firm can sustain its production
and pricing patterns in the long run depends on whether its fixed and
variable costs are actually being covered by the maximized net reve-
nue being generated. This will occur if average revenue equals or
exceeds average cost. If a producer charges different prices in two
different markets, average revenue is not equal to price, but falls
instead between the two prices. Thus the lower dumping price can
fail to meet average cost, while at the same time average revenue
may equal or exceed it. If a dumper's average revenue just exactly
equals average cost, any price above the profit-maximizing dumping
price in the export market would itself be money-losing and nonsus-
tainable, because average revenue would have to fall and thus would
fail to cover average cost.
49
The Test of Money-Losing Sales-Price Below Marginal Cost
If cost justification is set up as the benchmark of fairness in pricing,
marginal cost rather than unit cost would be the more appropriate
guideline. Only if price in the dumping market falls below marginal
cost can it be said that the dumper suffers out-of-pocket losses on the
dumping sales, at least in the short run, for the price he receives is not
even covering the incremental cost of the extra output. If the dumper
already holds a substantial part of the import market (and surely if he
has a monopoly position in that market), this would be alarming evi-
dence that he may be deliberately seeking to drive out or keep out
other competitors. On the other hand, if the dumper were a new en-
trant in an import market, even money-losing sales below marginal
cost could be considered fair competition if designed for promotional
purposes or to meet the temporarily low price of existing competitors.
50
Price discrimination itself has no bearing on the appropriateness of
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a price in relation to cost. The "just" or "fair" price, for purposes of
preserving healthy competitive rivalry, is not the highest price a
dumper charges in some other market, nor even average total cost. If
any limit price is relevant, it would be marginal cost, but even this
should not be considered a rigid rule for all competitors.
Welfare Maximization-Price Equal to Marginal Cost
A welfare approach to fairness at least does not contradict the mar-
ginal cost standard. Economists generally agree that, in the short
run, welfare within a single country is maximized when price equals
marginal cost.5 1 If price is held above marginal cost, or marginal
opportunity cost (the value of the output which could have been pro-
duced by the committed resources in their next best employment),
consumers who would be willing to purchase the next increment of
output at a slightly lower price are denied that opportunity even
though it would cost society less (marginal opportunity cost) than
consumers are willing to pay (price). Consumer welfare is thus being
sacrificed whenever price is held above marginal cost.
52
In the dumping context, of course, if the low dumping price is set
at marginal cost, the price in the home market must be above mar-
ginal cost. Thus, if welfare effects in the importing and exporting
countries are aggregated, one could no longer conclude that allowing
the low dumping price to fall to marginal cost would necessarily
maximize welfare. Instead, the gap between price and marginal cost
could widen in the high-price market by more than it contracts in the
low-price market, so that on balance welfare would be diminished.
From the point of view of this article, there are two reasons for
discounting the importance of aggregate welfare effects. First, we
are to analyze the proper role of the American antidumping law and
thus are primarily concerned with welfare effects in the United
States as an importing country. From that perspective the general
optimality of marginal cost pricing still holds. Imports sold at mar-
ginal cost are cheap. To the importing country it does not matter why
cheap imports are cheap, 53 or that higher prices are charged else-
where. If imports can be obtained at bargain prices, the importing
country can shift resources into other lines of production and have
more of both the imported product and the alternate product line
than would be available at higher import prices. If these benefits
outweigh the costs of adjusting to import competition (idle resources,
retraining workers, social dislocation from unemployment, start-up
costs for new production) when flat pricing is involved (the issue
under the safeguard provisions), they will generally do so when the
low price happens to involve discrimination. A dumping price below
marginal cost might have adverse significance because of the
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possible inference of predation, but even here it would be the below-
marginal-cost pricing and not the presence of discrimination that
would compel that inference.
Second, even if aggregate welfare were relevant to antidumping
policy in an importing country, there is no simple rule for determin-
ing how marginal cost dumping affects welfare in the aggregate.
One cannot assume that imposing a tariff on the low-priced dumped
imports will automatically shift sales to the high-price market and
reduce the gap between price and marginal cost in that market. This
is because a reduction in sales in the import market may also reduce
total production and drive price upward in the exporting country.
Indeed, economists have clearly demonstrated that the effect of
dumping may be to expand production and lower the price in the
high price market below the level which would prevail were dump-
ing forbidden.
5 4
In general, the effect of dumping on aggregate welfare is unpre-
dictable. Joan Robinson has shown that whether total output ex-
pands or not as a result of dumping depends upon the elasticities and
shapes of demand curves in the home and foreign markets.55 But
expansion or contraction of output is not decisive as to welfare ef-
fects even within the exporting nation alone. One must also know,
for example, whether expanded production occurs within a full em-
ployment economy and whether resources are attracted away from
industries in which greater distortions prevail.5 6 Furthermore, to de-
termine aggregate welfare effects, it would be necessary to counter-
balance any negative effects in the exporting country with positive
effects in the importing country or vice versa. 57 The upshot, then, is
that aggregate welfare effects are too indeterminate to be of practical
utility in assessing proper antidumping policy.
Moreover, the major source of welfare sub-optimization in the ex-
porting country is the gap between price and marginal cost. This
results from the degree of monopoly power possessed by producers in
that country. Thus if improving welfare in the exporting country is
the goal, policy measures should be directed at the source of the
problem-at attempts to increase competition in the home market
through vigorous enforcement of antitrust policy or reduction of re-
strictions on imports.
POLICY ANALYSIS OF DUMPING AND ANTIDUMPING LAWS
To reach a sound judgment about the wisdom and effectiveness of
antidumping measures, one must have a clear vision of precisely
what the mischief is that such measures are supposed to correct. The
large literature on antidumping abounds with asserted reasons for
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opposing dumping. In my opinion only one of these reasons-opposi-
tion to predatory pricing-is sound, and even it is a dubious basis for
special antidumping legislation because of the rare occurrence of
predatory dumping and the protective adequacy of the general anti-
trust laws. The other reasons put forward are either unsound or have
nothing to do with price discrimination. The arguments against
dumping fall into two categories: (1) those opposed to dumping in the
short run; and (2) those addressed to long term dumping. The only
really sound argument against dumping involves the short-run case
of predatory pricing; if an antidumping law is to be retained at all,
antipredation should be its exclusive touchstone.
Short-Run Dumping-The Issue of Impermanent Low Prices
Opposition to short-run dumping is generally based on its imperma-
nence. If dumping is short-run because it is predatory, it will be
followed by high monopoly prices once all competitors are driven out.
Even if it is not predatory, as the argument goes, it will impose
wasteful adjustment costs upon domestic producers, not counterbal-
anced by short-lived consumer benefits.
Antipredation-The Proper Touchstone of
Antidumping Law
In theory, predatory dumping involves a foreign monopolist who
sells his product in the import market at a low money-losing price for
a temporary period, while continuing to earn monopoly profits at
home, until he has driven out all competitors in the target market.
Thereafter, he raises his price in the newly conquered market to
monopoly levels. After recouping the prior losses, he begins to enjoy
a continuing stream of monopoly profits. Two elements are central to
the concept: money-losing sales and predatory objectives. Theoreti-
cally, any price below the profit-maximizing point could be con-
sidered money-losing and hence an indication of predatory motives.58
A test of money-losing which does not involve out-of-pocket losses,
however, would probably be administratively unworkable because
calculations of marginal revenue as well as marginal cost would be
needed. 59 Similarly, an attempt by a foreign monopolist to expand his
market share from 1 to 7 percent, for example, should not be defined
as predatory, because if monopoly power is not the goal, there seems
no reason to fear an ultimate rise in prices.
60
A persuasive line of economic analysis suggests that predatory
pricing will be rare because it is costly and the benefits are both
doubtful and in any event obtainable through less costly means. 61 A
monopolist contemplating a predatory attack would have great diffi-
culty predicting both how much he must suffer in losses before all
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competitors are driven out and how high he could raise the price
thereafter without attracting new entry. If entry barriers were low,
the price could not be raised much. Even if they were high, but the
changeover cost for the displaced productive facilities were low, a
slight rise in price would beckon the existing plant back into the
market under new management. Predatory pricing designed to in-
duce merger on the predator's terms or collusive price setting might
seem more probable because it is less costly. Ancillary predation of
this kind would also discourage entry by other firms who might
otherwise be attracted by the promise of a lucrative merger without a
fight.62 As Areeda and Turner point out, however, since price-fixing
and monopolistic mergers are already illegal, and the tactics just
described would be highly visible, predatory pricing even in this con-
text still seems unlikely. 63 Indeed, the empirical evidence available
appears to bear out these theoretical predictions that genuine preda-
tory pricing will be uncommon.6
The threat of predation seems even less serious in the context of
dumping. To be successful, the dumper must drive out not only local
producers in the target market but also competing third country ex-
porters. Even if the market for the product in question is regional
rather than worldwide, 65 the predator must achieve a monopoly in all
the countries in the region. If producers in a single country survive,
they are free to export to the target market and undercut the preda-
tor's price as soon as he seeks to raise it. A strategy aimed at such a
regional monopoly, or even a regional price cartel,6 6 would again be
highly visible and, if the United States were the target market, would
surely invite prosecution under the Sherman Act or the Antidumping
Act of 1916.67 Moreover, a would-be foreign predator must confront
the possibility of eight years of extra tariff protection (in addition
perhaps to adjustment assistance) for American producers under the
escape clause at the moment predatory tactics actually cause or
threaten serious injury, not to mention further congressional reac-
tion that might be anticipated if a creditable case of foreign preda-
tion were to emerge.
As with domestic predation, there is a similar lack of evidence that
predatory dumping has occurred with any frequency since the en-
forcement of strong antitrust laws. 68 Nevertheless, the practice could
result from miscalculation or the pursuit of personal, non-profit-
maximizing objectives; and no matter how infrequent, there should
be protection against it. The important question is what form that
protection should take.
First-Best Solution-The Sherman Act
For several reasons, in my opinion, protection should not take the
form of a special antidumping law. First, the very implausibility of
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predatory dumping as a genuine threat cuts against the need for spe-
cial legislation. Second, the presence of price discrimination has little,
if anything, to do with the threat of predation. Although a foreign
producer bent on predation would probably discriminate in price to
limit his losses to the target market, discriminatory pricing can also be
(and usually is) an innocent response to differences in demand. More-
over, high monopoly profit at home is not the only source of the neces-
sary financial staying power to pursue a predatory strategy. This could
be found as well in past accumulated profits or in large profits from
other product lines in a multiproduct conglomerate. Thus, there is no
reason to single out dumping for special scrutiny.
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Third, the existence of a special anti-price discrimination law car-
ries with it the cost of discouraging all price competition, even the
healthy variety. This point has been made with force and cogency in
the current debate over the usefulness of the Robinson-Patman Act
7 0
and applies with even greater force in the antidumping context,
given the lesser threat of predatory dumping just mentioned and the
point which follows. Fourth, American producers are already ade-
quately protected from any import competition, including dumping,
under the escape clause if there is serious injury to an American
industry or under the adjustment assistance provisions if there is
serious injury instead to individual firms.
Fifth, and most important, the existing domestic antitrust laws are
entirely adequate to protect against the threat of predation from for-
eign dumpers. The domestic Robinson-Patman Act 7' would not be a
good surrogate both because it is still an anti-price discrimination
law and because it might not be available on jurisdictional grounds
for use against predatory dumping. 72 There would be no such diffi-
culty, however, with the Sherman Act section 2 provisions against
monopolization or attempts to monopolize "any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... ,,73
The Sherman Act has long been applied against all forms of preda-
tory pricing, not just discriminatory predation,7 4 and there would be
no difficulty in obtaining personal jurisdiction over aforeign supplier
against whom a colorable case could be made of seeking through
predatory dumping to monopolize an American market.7 5 Moreover,
as a general antimonopoly law, the Sherman Act would counter
predatory dumping without chilling all price rivalry.
Second-Best Solution-Revision of the Antidumping Act
If the antidumping law is retained in American law,7 6 however,
Congress should at least revise the current statute to insure that it
applies only to predatory dumping or threats thereof and is only mini-
mally restrictive of healthy price competition from imports. First, and
most important, the injury concept in the current statute should be
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revised to include only injury to competition and not injury to individ-
ual competitors. The current language of the Act, which requires the
ITC to find "whether an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured, .. .-77 shows no sensitivity to this problem. Even
the current language of the Robinson-Patman Act which prohibits
price discrimination only "where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a mono-
poly in any line of commerce.. .-78 has not restricted the application
of Robinson-Patman to only genuinely predatory practices. 79 If noth-
ing else could be achieved, however, the Robinson-Patman language
would be a substantial improvement over the current Antidumping
Act. It is difficult to see why the same standard should not apply to
both international and domestic price discrimination.
Under whatever statutory language is used, the primary problem
would be to identify when a firm is pricing predatorily. As suggested
earlier, a four-part test looking to predatory intent, market structure,
competitive conduct, and cost information, but with emphasis on
intent, could be used to identify predatory pricing.80 Areeda and
Turner have recently rejected the "empty formulae" traditionally
used by courts in predatory pricing cases, including predatory intent,
and urge instead a test that would rely exclusively upon the relation
between a firm's price and certain cost factors. 81 In simplified terms,
they argue a price should be deemed predatory if below short-run
marginal cost-or rather, the more administrable surrogate, "reason-
ably anticipated average variable cost."'82 Such a price would clearly
involve out-of-pocket losses, since not even the variable cost of pro-
ducing the output would be covered. a3
The strengths of the Areeda and Turner approach lie in its admin-
istrability and the balance struck in favor of price competition at the
seemingly slight risk of condoning some predatory tactics. On the
other hand, the marginal cost test is inflexible and may carry more
than a slight risk of encouraging predation because of its predictabil-
ity. 4 Alternatively, it might be used to establish a presumption, with
the burden of rebuttal falling on the opposing party. The rebutting
evidence might include some of the elements of the four-part test
mentioned above. It is not my intention here to resolve definitively
how best to identify predatory pricing, but rather to indicate that
there are several workable approaches for a court or agency facing
that issue.
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Second, a revised Antidumping Act should provide explicitly for two
important defenses: meeting competition and promotional pricing.
The meeting competition defense now contained in the Robinson-
Patman Act would provide an appropriate guideline.88 Perhaps a
dumper who had already achieved a monopoly position in the Ameri-
can market should be denied this defense if the meeting competition
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price fell below the dumper's short run marginal cost.8 7 Money-losing
prices would thus be charged merely to retain a monopoly position, a
tactic which seems predatory. On the other hand, a defense under the
proposed Antidumping Act would not imply exemption from section 2
of the Sherman Act, under which such a practice by a monopolist
could still be prohibited.88 If the dumper does not already have a
monopoly position in the American market, the meeting competition
defense should be applied with flexibility to take account of the likely
need of a foreign supplier to charge prices below the American level to
overcome consumer bias against a foreign source of supply.
The promotional pricing defense would be designed to allow dump-
ing as a means of entering a new market, even if the low dumping
price fell below the dumper's marginal cost. As long as such a tactic
was truly promotional (hence temporary) and was used by suppliers
with none or only a small share of the market in question, it would
increase the competitive structure of the market by adding another
competitor and would increase the range of choice provided con-
sumers. The defense might appropriately be limited to dumpers with
less than a given percentage, perhaps 10 percent, of the relevant
American market.89
Third-Best Solution-
The International Antidumping Code
If Congress fails to repeal the Antidumping Act or to recast it along
the lines just sketched, the question arises whether the current statu-
tory provisions could be interpreted to apply only to predatory dump-
ing. The legislative history of the 1921 Act contains roughly as much
support for an antitrust as for an escape clause interpretation of the
Act. 90 Now that the 1974 Trade Act has freed the escape clause of the
former link between increased imports and trade agreement conces-
sions and thus made of it a more general provision for protection
against all seriously injurious imports, whatever their source, there is
even more reason to stress the potential antitrust nature of the current
Antidumping Act. Candor requires one to concede, however, that the
current provisions of the Antidumping Act have an escape-clause
cast-injury to competitors rather than competition.91 The essentially
neutral reaction of Congress to the International Antidumping Code, 92
which sought higher standards through escape-clause-like concepts
of injury, causation, and industry, is also not a strong signal that the
Antidumping Act should be given a thoroughgoing antitrust reading.
Thus, under the current provisions, the most one could urge would be
that the ITC adopt the Antidumping Code standards of injury, causa-
tion and industry, which, although not aimed genuinely at predatory
dumping, at least reduce the potential of the Antidumping Act to
eliminate all price competition in the import trade.
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Nonpredatory Injurious Dumping:
An Inadequate Basis for Antidumping Relief
Short-Term Dumping in General
The argument for extending antidumping relief to nonpredatory
dumping if it causes serious injury to producers in the importing
country traces to Viner's classic work on dumping.93 Viner grounded
his opposition to all injurious dumping upon two premises: (1) that
dumping prices are generally temporary; and (2) that serious injury
to producers cannot be offset by short-lived consumer benefits.
Neither of these propositions rests upon reliable empirical evidence
or rigorous theoretical analysis.
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Although Viner himself thought the presumption of dumping im-
permanence to be weak,95 he wrote before the full force of marginal-
ist analysis was well known and understood. As the previous eco-
nomic analysis demonstrates, whenever a producer has some degree
of market power in his home market and can prevent arbitrage-very
common conditions-he will actually maximize his profits by charg-
ing a lower price in any national market with a more elastic demand
than his home market. Thus there is no a priori reason for presum-
ing from evidence of price discrimination alone that dumping will be
impermanent. Only if money-losing sales are involved-for example,
if the dumping price falls below marginal cost-would there be a
basis for such a presumption. But this of course might bring the case
within the predatory category and, in any event, has nothing to do
with the discrimination in price.
Viner's second premise poses further difficulties. Even if we knew
from reliable empirical evidence that dumping prices tend to be tem-
porary, we could not say, by concentrating only on injury to pro-
ducers, that such injury is never outweighed by benefits to con-
sumers, even if short-lived. The longer the low prices last, even if
ultimately terminated, the greater the accumulation of welfare ben-
efits to consumers to offset the adjustment costs suffered by pro-
ducers and workers. Nothing in the formula for opposing all injuri-
ous dumping takes account of these accumulating benefits. Thus, to
support that formula we would need empirical evidence not only that
dumping is likely to be temporary, but that it is also not likely, when
it does cause serious injury, to last long enough for accumulating
welfare benefits to offset that injury.
Furthermore, short-term dumping can have beneficial effects on
an importing country not directly attributable to the cheapness in
price. If the dumping price is for market entry purposes, even after
the low promotional price is terminated, another supplier will have
been added to the market, thus increasing the competitive structure
of the industry and providing consumers with a wider array of goods
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from which to choose. A producer already supplying a foreign mar-
ket might also dump temporarily to meet competition and retain his
position in that market. This has similar beneficial effects on the
competitiveness of market structure and the range of consumer
choices. Moreover, a supplier may simply be experimenting in price
to test market alternatives or may be coping as best he can with an
uncertain world in which he must guess at the price his competitors
will charge or when to make discount concessions to an influential
importer. It is precisely this kind of competitive pricing that should
be fostered, not rejected, both in the domestic and international
sectors of the economy. The very foreignness of the source of supply
may be a significant feature in undermining oligopolistic price dis-
cipline in the import market, since foreign producers are less easily
assimilated into the culture of common expectations that underlies
price discipline. 96 The unsystematic character of these pricing prac-
tices-promotional meeting competition, experimental or ad hoc-
has a positive effect on the competitive process. More systematic
pricing conduct could be adverse to competitive rivalry, because it
might reflect adherence to oligopolistic price discipline or an at-
tempt at predation.
One might question whether most of these cases would fall within
an antidumping law conditioned upon the existence of serious injury
caused by the dumped imports. Promotional and experimental pric-
ing would not be likely to produce serious injury, and dumping to
meet competition would probably fail the causation test. If the tests
of "serious injury" and "causation" had real substance to them, this
response would be more satisfying than it is, given the low standards
of injury and causation the ITC now uses in antidumping cases.
Since both of these standards have higher thresholds in a safeguard
proceeding, this is an additional reason for favoring that form of
relief for temporarily cheap imports. Indeed, the very temporariness
of the escape clause and adjustment assistance remedies accords
more closely with the nature of the adversity against which protec-
tion is sought-impermanent low prices from imports. Under the
1974 Trade Act, escape clause relief can be obtained for five years,
with a possible extension for three additional years. 97 Low import
prices which last beyond eight years could hardly be classified as
temporary.98
Special Case of Cyclical Demand Dumping
In a recent study, W. Wares argues that antidumping laws should
"prohibit dumping when it injures a domestic industry and, addition-
ally, involves the importation of a temporary supply of goods which
would not otherwise be marketed." 99 Wares' paradigm case is that of
the foreign producer who would not supply the import market in
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times of stable demand but does so at dumping prices only during
recessionary periods in his home market. The case was carefully
chosen. 100 There could indeed exist a profit-maximizing producer
whose marginal revenue at home during normal times would exceed
marginal revenue in the import market; he would thus not normally
supply the foreign market. During a recession at home, such a pro-
ducer could experience a fall in marginal revenue at the optimal
output (although this is not a necessary result) sufficient to make
what originally seemed an inadequately low marginal revenue in the
foreign market now appear attractive. If demand elasticity in the
foreign market at the optimum marginal revenue point were greater
than at home (not a necessary result), then the producer would begin
to dump during such a recession (but not necessarily during every
recession). Given these conditions, it is also true that as demand falls
gradually in the home market during different recessions, a profit-
maximizing dumper would begin to sell in the foreign market sooner
than would a flat-pricing producer. This is because the dumper
would do so as soon as falling marginal revenue at home reached the
maximum price at which some quantity of goods could be sold in the
foreign market,10 1 whereas the flat-pricing producer would do so only
when home price, always above marginal revenue, reached that
point. Thus, in some cases of recession at home a dumper would
supply the foreign market temporarily, whereas a flat-pricing pro-
ducer would not.
Can one conclude from this that antidumping measures should be
employed against such a case? I think not, for both theoretical and
practical reasons. To be sound, such a conclusion must rest on the
same two premises central to Viner's conclusion: (1) the low price
will be temporary, and (2) a temporary low price seriously injurious
to producers will lower welfare.1
0 2
The first premise raises more practical than theoretical problems.
As explained, there are cases in which a profit-maximizing producer
experiencing a recession in his home market will shift some of his
output to a foreign market for the first time, will do so only for the
period of the recession, and will do so only if he is allowed to dump.
Nevertheless, to determine whether a given case of dumping falls
into this category, one would presumably need separate findings that
(1) there is dumping, (2) that the foreign producer has not tradition-
ally supplied the import market, (3) that the foreign producer is expe-
riencing a recession at home, and perhaps (4) that the recession is
the cause of the dumping. No presumption of impermanence can
arise from dumping alone. If the concurrence of dumping and reces-
sion at home were to trigger relief without further findings, we would
include cases of traditional suppliers who may have been dumping
all along and could continue to do so after the recession. 10 3 Thus the
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full list of findings would seem necessary, and they would clearly be
administratively burdensome. How many shipments in the past and
during which time periods, would lead to the conclusion that a pro-
ducer is a traditional supplier? What would be the indicia of reces-
sion? Would it turn on the state of the foreign economy as a whole or
the state of the given industry, or both? As to the condition of the
given industry in the producer's country, how would one distinguish
between a cyclical downturn in demand and a fall off attributable to
the success of substitute products? For causation to be shown, how
close in time must the initiation of dumping and the beginning of the
recession be? Would it be possible to speak of a beginning point for a
recession?
Even a positive finding on each of the issues listed would not guar-
antee that the dumping would be temporary. The dumper, although
induced to export initially because of the recession, might discover
the export market to be more profitable than anticipated and con-
tinue to sell there after the recession ends. The recession could also
produce permanent changes in home demand so that the export mar-
ket would become profitable in the long run.
The tests listed would also be underinclusive. A flat-pricing pro-
ducer might also react to a recession at home by exporting for a tempo-
rary period. Eliminating all cases of recession-induced dumping will
not necessarily eliminate even most cases of recession-induced tem-
porary imports. Furthermore, if the mischief needing correction is the
serious injury to competing producers caused by impermanent low
prices, the safeguard provisions are again a far better approach to the
problem.
The second premise-that a temporary low price which injures pro-
ducers will lower welfare-is just as dubious when applied to cyclical
demand dumping as when urged in connection with Viner's opposi-
tion to all injurious dumping. There is the same failure to take ac-
count of the welfare benefits inherent in the procompetitive effects
on market structure and competitor conduct in the import market,
even if the low price is temporary. Although in the cyclical demand
case the meeting competition argument falls away because the for-
eign dumper is assumed not to have supplied the market previously,
the arguments of promotional, experimental and ad hoc pricing still
have force. Thus, a new competitor may be added to the market in
any case in which, although a recession in the home market induced
the exports initially, the dumper through promotional or experimen-
tal pricing discovers a permanently profitable market. Moreover,
even if the new competitor eventually withdraws, so that market
structure is not made more competitive, the temporary low prices
will tend to disrupt any pattern of oligopolistic price discipline in the
import market, either nascent or entrenched. 1°4
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The presumption of overall negative welfare effects also ignores
the accumulating consumer benefits which derive from the low-
priced imports for as long as they last. The cyclical demand case,
however, raises in its most potent form the argument that there may
be no consumer benefits at all, because producers, after experiencing
a period of abnormally low prices during the recession-induced im-
port invasion, will simply raise prices to higher levels during periods
of normal demand. If one takes into account that firms may be risk
averse to some extent, the long-run average price could actually be
higher under cyclical dumping than under conditions of stable com-
petition because risk averse firms would need some inducement to
incur the risks of fluctuations in intensity of price competition.106
This is not, however, an inevitable result. For the parallel case of
cutthroat competition among a group of oligopolistic producers, F.M.
Scherer has shown that prices need not rise during periods of normal
demand by exactly the amount they have fallen in periods of intense
price competition to recoup losses in the latter period. Whether they
must or not, disregarding the factor of risk aversion, depends on the
elasticity of the short-run industry supply curve and whether the
demand curve becomes more or less elastic in the trough of intense
price competition. The more elastic the supply function in the range
of normal equilibrium and the more elastic the demand function be-
comes as overall demand falls, the more likely it is that price will not
need to increase during normal demand periods by as much as it falls
during periods of intense price competition. 106 In industries with high
fixed costs and low variable costs, it is likely that supply is indeed
inelastic. 0 7 But when the demand curve in the import market falls
because of temporary price competition from a dumper, the curve
would probably become more elastic (import market producers could
recoup a substantial portion of sales merely by lowering price).
Scherer doubts that cutthroat competition among oligopolistic pro-
ducers would become destructive and reduce overall welfare, since
on the evidence available he considers the risk premia needed to
attract capital to fluctuating demand industries to be small. 10 8 There
is even further reason to doubt the cutthroat competition argument
as applied to dumping because of the likely increase in elasticity
when dumping causes demand to fall.
The argument that prices must rise during normal times to offset
losses during periods of intense price competition also assumes that
firms in the industry are not engaged in oligopolistic price discipline
to earn above normal profits. Shutting out the dumper shuts out an
important check on that assumption, which, if it is wrong, means
that consumers may at all times pay high monopoly prices and never
benefit from lower ones. Such risks hardly seem justified, especially
given the availability of escape clause and adjustment assistance
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relief to aid any firms or industries seriously injured by import com-
petition. Escape clause relief itself carries some of these same risks,
but at least the standards of serious injury and causation have
greater significance, and there is not the chilling effect on price com-
petition that accompanies an antidumping law. If adjustment assis-
tance becomes the preferred remedy, as I think it should, the costs to
the consumer would be even further reduced.
Long-Run Dumping-Indistinguishable from Other Imports
Economists generally agree that long-run dumping cannot be distin-
guished from any other long-term flow of imports in its effects on the
welfare of an importing nation. The low price improves welfare by
expanding the real goods available for consumption in the importing
country. Since the supply will continue indefinitely, there is no fear
that adjustment costs will be wasteful.
Recently, however, B. Fisher has argued that this is too sanguine a
view of long-term dumping. He urges two significant arguments
against all forms of dumping other than the inconsequential, spo-
radic type. First, all dumping leads to resource misallocation on a
global scale, 10 9 and second, failure to impose antidumping duties
misses an opportunity to put pressure on countries following exces-
sively protectionist trade policies. 110
Fisher's first argument raises the problem of second-best. For
dumping to occur, there must be monopoly power in the dumper's
home market. The existence of that power leads to resource misallo-
cation, because the monopolist restricts his output and charges a
price well above marginal cost, the social optimum. A first-best
world would be one without such monopoly power. But if we assume
for the moment, as seems realistic, that there will be monopoly
power in the home market whether dumping is allowed or not, the
question becomes whether the second best solution for world welfare
coincides with fiat-pricing or price discrimination by the monopolist.
Put in this way, the complexity of the issue raised by Fisher's argu-
ment becomes more obvious. Indeed, most economists agree that a
priori the global efficiency effects of dumping are essentially indeter-
minate."1 This is so whether the analysis focuses on the state of
welfare in the exporting country alone" 2 or includes effects in the
exporting and importing countries concurrently"13; whether it fo-
cuses on resource allocation and the related question of total output
expansion or contraction under dumping, 1 4 or incorporates a broader
analysis of both production and distribution efficiency in interna-
tional trade"'; and whether it makes drastic simplifying assump-
tions or deals with more realistic parameters."16 The conclusion in all
of these cases is the same: from a global perspective, the overall
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efficiency effects are indeterminate. They depend on such factors as
the shapes and elasticities of demand curves in the export and im-
port markets, 117 whether the dumping firm faces constant, increas-
ing or decreasing costs, 118 and even how the dumping firm's elastic-
ity of supply compares with the ratio of demand elasticity in the
import market to that in the export market.1 19
The upshot is that we cannot know as a general matter whether
dumping increases or decreases global welfare. It would clearly be
infeasible to devise and administer an antidumping law which re-
quired a determination of the kinds of variables just mentioned. The
confusion introduced by Fisher's resource misallocation argument
lies in his failure to realize, or explain clearly, that it is the existence
of monopoly power in the dumper's home market that produces the
basic resource misallocation, not dumping. Given this distortion as a
starting point, no general conclusions can be drawn a priori as to
whether dumping will heighten or lessen the distortion. If the objec-
tive is to improve efficiency in the world economy, then action must
be taken to increase competition in the dumper's home market
through, for example, vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws or
elimination of restrictions on import competition.
This last point raises Fisher's second argument for opposing long-
term dumping-that failure to do so misses an opportunity to put pres-
sure on the dumper's home government to remove excessive restric-
tions to foreign competition in its own market. 120 If such restrictions
exist, they will indeed increase the market power of foreign dumpers,
allow such firms to charge higher prices at home, and hence increase
the likelihood of dumping. Would an antidumping policy, however, be
an effective and appropriate antidote to such a condition?
Surely we are entitled to be skeptical that a government, which by
hypothesis has insufficient incentive to reduce import restrictions to
benefit its domestic consumers, will do so because its trading part-
ners are imposing antidumping duties on the exports of some of its
monopolistic firms. If that government feared that antidumping ac-
tions would harm its balance of payments, it would hardly react by
unilaterally lowering its own import restrictions and thus worsening
its balance of payments. Certainly if the dumping firms themselves
complain, they will seek of their government retaliatory increases in
trade barriers, not reduced tariffs.
Moreover, if the objective is to drive the high tariff country to the
bargaining table to obtain tariff concessions, there is no reason to
limit the pressure to instances of dumping. A general surcharge on
all imports from the country in question would be more effective.
Alternatively, the surcharge could be imposed on any import from an
industry which receives exceedingly high tariff protection, or its
equivalent, in the high tariff country.
121
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An antidumping policy designed to induce tariff concessions would
be both over inclusive and under inclusive. The ability of a dumper to
prevent arbitrage is not always dependent upon the existence of a
tariff wall around his home market. An effective division of markets
can come about because of high transport costs or unique product
specifications for a particular market. Thus, antidumping duties
would be imposed in many cases of long-run dumping not attribut-
able to excessive trade restrictions in the home market. At the same
time, antidumping action would not be taken against a dumper actu-
ally benefiting from a high tariff wall at home who decides to raise
his export price to eliminate the margin of dumping. Although the
volume of his sales will decline, on the sales he makes the dumper
will receive an extra margin of profit that would have gone to the
importing country's treasury had a direct surcharge been used. The
dumper could also take the opposite tack and lower his home market
price, so that antidumping action would again not be taken. Again,
tariff barriers would not come down. Rather, it would now be even
more difficult for foreign firms to compete at the new low price in the
dumper's home market.
In summary then, the opportunity to use antidumping policy to in-
duce lower trade barriers abroad seems an opportunity well missed.
Moreover, seizing that opportunity would indeed miss a more impor-
tant opportunity of a different kind: the opportunity to improve compe-
tition, check tendencies toward oligopolistic price discipline, and
dampen inflation in the import market by encouraging healthy price
competition in the import trade.
CONCLUSION
The Antidumping Act of 1921 was enacted before the escape clause
was a part of our trade legislation 122 and before the antitrust laws
were regularly applied to acts outside of the United States. 123 Spurred
perhaps by years of seemingly intractable inflation, economists and
policymakers have increasingly recognized the deadening effect on
all price competition that an anti-price discrimination law can have.
There has thus been growing disaffection for the Robinson-Patman
Act, 124 the domestic counterpart of the Antidumping Act. The argu-
ments directed against the primary line provisions of Robinson-
Patman apply with equal or stronger force against the Antidumping
Act.' 25 Furthermore, the Trade Act of 1974 has amended the safe-
guard provisions to make relief more easily and more generally avail-
able. In particular, the prior requirement that increased imports be
linked to a trade concession has been eliminated. The safeguard pro-
visions are now generally available whenever imports increase, for
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whatever reason including dumping, sufficiently to cause serious in-
jury to American producers.
The upshot is that section 2 of the Sherman Act and the safeguard
provisions of the 1974 Trade Act provide entirely adequate remedies
for dealing with any genuinely adverse effects on American welfare
which may be caused by dumped imports. The Antidumping Act of
1921 should be repealed. This would not simply avoid redundancy in
the law or correct overly lax escape-clauselike decisions under the
Antidumping Act, it would end that Act's role in discouraging
healthy price competition from imports.
Should it become impossible to repeal the Antidumping Act, at a
minimum it should be redrafted to apply exclusively to predatory
dumping. The redrafting should be done with sensitivity to the di-
lemma that any law aimed explicitly at preventing predatory pricing
discourages all price competition, even the healthy variety. If such
redrafting were accomplished, virtually all of the cases now pro-
cessed under the Antidumping Act would be denied relief under that
Act, because in recent history none of the cases seems genuinely to
have involved predatory dumping. 128 Of course, in any given case,
relief might still be available under the safeguard provisions, if the
appropriate test of injury were met.
Even if repeal or redrafting of the Act is not accomplished, Trea-
sury and the ITC, the two agencies which administer different as-
pects of an antidumping proceeding, should apply the current law,
where proper statutory construction permits, so as to come as close
as possible to the objectives just stated. This has less significance for
Treasury, which should merely be vigilant in avoiding dumping find-
ings where adjustments for cost differences and circumstances of
sale can explain away apparent price discrimination. 127 The ITC, on
the other hand, should apply a substantially higher standard of
dumping injury128 in dumping cases.
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724-28.
83. Areeda and Turner concede
that a price above marginal
cost might still be non-profit
maximizing and predatory but
consider a marginal cost floor
the only administratively work-
able standard. Supra note 50,
at 709-12.
84. Scherer, for example, rejects
the marginal cost test advo-
cated by Areeda and Turner in
favor of a more flexible ap-
proach emphasizing long-run
welfare maximization.
Scherer, Predatory Pricing
and the Sherman Act: A Com-
ment, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 868
(1976). He calls for a "thor-
ough examination of the fac-
tual circumstances accompany-
ing the monopolist's alleged
predatory behavior," id. at 890,
to assess such variables as
"the relative cost positions of
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the monopolist and fringe
firms, the scale of entry re-
quired to secure minimum
costs, whether fringe firms are
driven out entirely or merely
suppressed, whether the mo-
nopolist expands its output to
replace the output of excluded
rivals or restricts supply again
when the rivals withdraw, and
whether any long-run compen-
satory expansion by the mo-
nopolist entails investment in
scale economy-embodying new
plant." Id. Areeda and Turner
argue that such an approach,
because of its complexity, has
"no operational utility for anti-
trust law purposes." Areeda &
Turner, Scherer on Predatory
Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 891, 897 (1976). For
Scherer's final response distin-
guishing between the stan-
dards for private treble dam-
age actions and suits initiated
by the Justice Department, see
Scherer, Some Last Words on
Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 901, 902-03 (1976).
85. For an attempt by the Depart-
ment of Justice to draft statu-
tory language prohibiting most
instances of genuine predation
while not overly inhibiting
healthy price competition and
the reactions of various com-
mentators to the attempt, see
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
64, at 276-307. The key provi-
sionof the draft "Predatory
Practices Act" setting out the
elements of a prima facie case
read as follows:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful
for the seller of a commodity
engaged in commerce overtly
to threaten a competing or po-
tential competing seller of the
commodity with economic or
physical harm, so as to cause or
induce the competing seller (a)
to conform to pricing policies
favored by the seller; or (b) to
cease or refrain from selling
any commodity to any particu-
lar customer; regardless of
whether any overt action is
taken to fulfill such threat.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful
for a seller of a commodity,
engaged in commerce, know-
ingly to sell on a sustained ba-
sis such commodity at a price
below the reasonably antici-
pated average direct operat-
ing expense incurred in sup-
plying the commodity, where
such commodity is sold for
use, consumption, or resale
within the United States, the
District of Columbia, or any
other territory under the juris-
diction of the United States.
Id. at 277.
The test in section 3 of "reason-
ably anticipated average direct
operating expense" is intended
to codify the Areeda and
Turner approach.
86. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act contains this pro-
viso: "Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall
prevent a seller rebutting the
primafacie case thus made
by showing that his lower
price.., was made in good
faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor. . ." 15
U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
87. See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 50, at 715-16.
88. For a similar analysis of the
Justice Department's draft
"Predatory Practices Act" see
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
64, at 277, 286-87.
89. For a similar approach in the
Justice Department's draft
"predatory Practices Act" see
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
64, at 278, 287.
90. See Barcel6, supra note 10, at
515, 516.
91. The statute requires the ITC to
determine "whether an indus-
try in the United States is be-
ing or is likely to be injured."
19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
92. See Barcel6, supra note 10, at
533-38.
93. J. VINER, supra note 65.
94. Viner's belief that dumping
would normally be short-term
or intermittent was based more
upon personal observation of a
number of cases than on care-
ful empirical study. See Memo-
randum on Dumping in J.
VINER, supra note 65, at 358-
59. Moreover, producers today
are probably more outward-
looking and more interested in
maximizing profits on a multi-
national level than was the
case when Viner formed his
impressions. Thus, modem
producers might be more likely
to engage in long-term dump-
ing if the practice is profit-
maximizing. See W. WAREs,
supra note 39, at 79-80.
95. See Memorandum on Dump-
ing in J. VINER, supra note 65,
at 358-59.
96. See R. CAVEs & R. JONES,
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS
153 (1977).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h) (1976).
98. The effects of hit-and-run
dumping lasting one to two
years with some interval be-
tween could also be remedied
by escape clause action. Al-
though 19 U.S.C. § 2251(e)
(1976) provides as a general
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rule that one full year must
elapse after an ITC report con-
cerning a given subject matter
before another investigation
can begin, the case of "hit-and-
run" low prices would seem to
fall easily within the exception
to that general rule for "good
cause determined by the Com-
mission to exist." Id.
99. W. WAREs, supra note 39, at
84.
100. In selecting this case Wares
eliminates two others: (i) re-
cession in the import market
and (ii) recession in the home
market where the dumper
ships some quantity of output
to the import market both be-
fore and after the recession.
See id. at 81-83. In the first
case Wares seems to oppose
antidumping action primarily
because it is arguable that the
recession, not the imports,
caused the injury and because
the dumper, as a permanent
supplier, is entitled to meet the
competition in the trough of a
recession on an equal basis
with domestic producers. At
most, he seems to say, an ar-
gument might be made for re-
ducing all import competition
by some given percentage, not
a disproportionate reduction of
dumped imports. This parallels
my argument that the escape
clause should be the remedy
for nonpredatory dumping.
The only distinction between
the second case and that dis-
cussed in the text seems to be
an equitable notion favorable to
the supplier who is there in good
times and bad. In both cases the
low price is assumed to be
injurious and to last only for the
duration of the recession. I
90 -Antidumping Law
disagree with Wares, however,
not for excluding the second
case above, but rather for in-
cluding the case discussed in
the text as a cause for anti-
dumping action.
101. Recall that the condition for
profit maximization when
dumping is allowed is equal-
ization of marginal revenue in
all markets. See id. at 32-34.
102. This second point is given very
little consideration by Wares.
Speaking of the special case
described in the text, he as-
serts: "This type of dumping
will, in fact, disrupt the import
market and reduce welfare
whenever it injures domestic
producers." Id. at 84. Except
for a footnote (p. 77 n.e.) in
which he notes the possibility
that a competitive industry
may well raise its prices in
normal times to offset low
prices in abnormal times so as
to eliminate benefits to the
consumer in the long run,
Wares offers no analysis or em-
pirical evidence to support this
assertion. Even the footnote
does not argue that a competi-
tive industry will always or
even probably react in the way
he describes. He does note,
however, that to the degree
firms in the industry are risk
averse, there would be pressure
for prices in normal times to rise
even higher than would be nec-
essary merely to keep the long
run average price unchanged.
103. See note 99, supra, calling at-
tention to Wares' exclusion of
the traditional supplier from
his proposed antidumping rule,
on the ground it seems of eq-
uity. Inclusion of the tradi-
tional supplier, however,
would raise the question of
why protective action should
be taken only against reces-
sion-induced temporarily low
prices, instead of all temporar-
ily low prices.
104. Indeed, the American industries
which generally press anti-
dumping complaints are fre-
quently oligopolistic in struc-
ture. See Barcel6, supra note 10,
at 512-13.
105. See W. WARES, supra note 81,
at 77 n.e., citing A. Sandmo,
On the Theory of the Competi-
tive Firm Under Price Uncer-
tainty, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 65
(1971).
106. See generally F. SCHERER, su-
pra note 70, at 202-06.
107. Id.
108.
109.
Id.
Fisher, supra note 68, at 147;
C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LIN-
DERT, INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMICS 168 (6th ed. 1978).
Fisher suggests that Robert
Baldwin also makes this argu-
ment. But the suggestion is
misleading. Baldwin points out
that monopoly power in the
home market underlies dump-
ing and that monopoly power
itself implies distortions from
optimal welfare goals. R. BALD-
WIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 143
(1970). He does not say that
dumping adds to the ineffi-
ciency or that vigorous enforce-
ment of antidumping laws is an
appropriate remedy for such in-
efficiency. Rather he advocates
"vigorous enforcement of inter-
nal antimonopoly policies and
reduction of the various tariff
and nontariff barriers that pro-
tect the domestic firms from for-
eign competition." Id.
110. Fisher, supra note 68, at 145-
46. Fisher urges opposition to
long-term dumping on two fur-
ther grounds. He argues that
long-term dumping should be
opposed because it may cause
unemployment. Id. at 146-47.
This, however, is the classic
fallacy of listing, as a reason
for opposing dumping, conse-
quences which have nothing to
do with dumping. Hence, this
is not an argument for treating
dumped imports any differ-
ently than nondumped im-
ports. Perhaps under certain
circumstances action should
be taken against any import
which causes unemployment,
but this is not an argument for
differentially harsh treatment
of dumping.
Fisher also reasons that "con-
tinuous dumping is a concealed
partial devaluation of the cur-
rency of the exporting country."
Id. at 147. This is simply inac-
curate. The pricing policies of
private firms cannot be likened
to a government decision to
devalue its currency, wholly or
partially. Indeed, if dumping by
a group of private firms sud-
denly causes a large increase in
exports, this action would exert
pressure toward revaluation,
not devaluation, of the dump-
er's currency. From Fisher's full
discussion it appears that he
has in mind the case in which
the exporting country syste-
matically offers bounties on all
exports and that this in turn
causes dumping. But of course
in such a case the source of the
"partial devaluation" is the sys-
tem of export subsidies, not the
dumping. Price discrimination
is not even a necessary result of
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such a government policy. On
the connection between export
subsidies and price discrimina-
tion, see Barcel6, supra note 43,
at 783-84.
111. See text accompanying notes
54-57, supra. But see KINDLE-
BERGER & LINDERT, supra note
109 at 168. Kindleberger and
Lindert assert that since the dis-
tortion of price above marginal
cost is greater in the home than
in the export market, "forcing
the firm to equalize prices and
shift its sales back toward the
home market probably brings
gains to the world as a whole
even if it deprives the importing
country.., of a bargain." Id. If
it were certain, or even highly
probable, that eliminating
dumping would indeed lower
price in the home market, such
a conclusion might be sound.
But disallowing dumping could
reduce the dumper's total out-
put and cause price in the home
market to increase. Indeed,
even if the transfer of sales from
the export to the home market
were to offset the decrease in
production causing a net
increase in sales in the home
market, there would still be con-
flicting effects on aggregate
welfare. While lowering the
high price to consumers in the
home market at the expense of
raising it to consumers in the
low price market might improve
welfare, there is still a negative
production effect, because less
is produced in an industry
where price exceeds marginal
cost. Optimum resource alloca-
tion would call for increased,
not decreased, production. Thus
the overall welfare effect still
seems indeterminate.
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112. See W. WARES, supra note 39,
at 27-55.
113. See 2 J. MEADE, supra note 57,
at 244-53.
114. See J. ROBINSON, supra note 54,
at 188-95. Robinson argued a
priori that output under dis-
criminating monopoly was
likely to expand, especially
where low-priced export sales
are involved. Id. at 205-06. But
Scherer has noted the absence
of any empirical evidence on
this point. F. SCHERER, supra
note 70, at 259.
115. See 2 J. MEADE, supra note 57,
at 244-53.
116. For an analysis attempting to
deal with realistic parameters,
see W. WARES, supra note 39,
at 27-55.
117. See J. ROBINSON, supra note
54, at 188-95.
118. See W. WARES, supra note 39,
at 27-54.
119. See 2 J. MEADE, supra note 51,
at 252.
120. See Fisher, supra note 68, at
145-46.
121. The President seems to have
authority to take such action
under section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1976).
122. Although an escape clause was
a part of several bilateral
Trade Agreements before then,
it became a general part of do-
mestic law with the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of
1951, (§§ 6a, 7; 65 Stat. 73,
74). See generally Ris, "Es-
cape Clause" Relief Under the
Trade Act of 1974: New Stan-
dards, Same Results, 16
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297,
298-04 (1977).
123. After the Supreme Court in
American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909), refused to give extra-
territorial force to the Sherman
Act, the first important case
departing from that doctrine
was United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1927).
124. See authorities listed supra at
note 70.
125. The arguments are potentially
stronger because of the very
weak injury test applied in anti-
dumping cases. See text accom-
panying notes 12-37, supra.
126. Where predatory dumping has
been alleged, see, e.g., Fisher,
supra note 68, at 118-24, the
discussion has not indicated
that out-of-pocket losses were
involved or that monopoliza-
tion of the market was a genu-
ine threat.
127. In light of Treasury's recent af-
front to the Sherman Act in
the new "trigger price mecha-
nism" for certain steel imports,
see notes 46-47, supra, the
statement in the text is proba-
bly too charitable. For an un-
successful case challenging
the legality of the trigger price
mechanism and Treasury's au-
thority to resort to such a
scheme, without directly rais-
ing the antitrust issues, see
Davis-Walker Corp. v. Blumen-
thal, No. 78-0421 (D.D.C. May
25, 1978), reprinted at 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 992
(1978). There seems little
doubt that the effect of the
trigger price mechanism has
been to prevent imports below
the trigger price and that this
was Treasury's intent. For a
more critical overall view of
the Treasury's role in anti-
dumping cases, see generally
W. WARES, supra note 39, at
93-110.
128. For example, the higher stan-
dard of dumping injury could
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be that formulated in the Inter-
national Antidumping Code.
See generally Barcel6, supra
note 10.
